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Abstract 
Our model examines how co-existence of market power and noncompliance affects the efficiency and effectiveness of 
a cap-and-trade system with banking-borrowing in a finite period model. The dynamic equilibrium analysis here 
extends the results of the established literature, and we show that the initial allocation of permits to the dominant firm 
continues to play a significant role in both the cost-efficiency of abatement, as well as effectiveness of the cap-and-
trade system. The presence of cheating, however, makes the permit demand of firms more price-elastic compared to a 
model with no cheating. Moreover, the second-order price sensitivity of the permit demand of the dominant firm plays 
a critical role in the compliance behavior of the dominant firm. We analyze the relationship between violation of a 
fringe firm and the dominant firm, illustrating the asymmetrical implications for when the dominant firm is a buyer of 
permits versus a seller of permits. Since we expect the regulator to reduce initial permit allocations over time, we also 
examine its impact on non-compliance behavior of the dominant firm.
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1.   Introduction 
 
It is well-established that the emission permit market equilibrium fails to achieve an efficient 
outcome in the presence of market power (Hahn 1984) and non-compliance among firms (Malik 
1990).  In an imperfect permit market, the outcome diverges from the abatement cost-minimizing 
efficient equilibrium, except in the rare occasion when the initial permit allocation matches the 
dominant firm’s equilibrium demand for permits. The presence of twin imperfections (in market 
structure and in regulation) reinforces the critical role of the initial distribution of permits among 
firms (Egteren and Weber 1996).   
 
In practice, emissions trading systems have typically been implemented in finite time horizons, 
most prominently in the US (e.g. sulfur dioxide allowance trading program Phase I during 1995-
1999 under the US Clean Air Act Amendment 1990) and more recently in the European Union 
(e.g.  two-phase  carbon  dioxide  trading  in  2005-07  and  2008-12).    Such  multi-year  trading 
programs allow for banking and borrowing for greater temporal flexibility in the dynamic cost 
minimization problem of the polluters.
1 
   
Augmentation  of  permit  banking  and  borrowing  in  an  emissions  trading  model  allows  for 
temporal efficiency through reallocation of emissions over time.  While Rubin (1996) examined 
banking and borrowing with no market imperfections, Stranlund, Chavez and Costello (2005) 
incorporated noncompliance along with banking-borrowing in a perfect competitive setting to 
examine the regulatory role.  In the latter model, the incentive to cheat stems from static gains as 
well as dynamic gains through saving permits for future use. The Chevallier (2008) model on 
inter-temporal permit trading in the presence of market power (but no cheating) demonstrated 
that the resultant price-distortion is a function of price elasticity of demand for permits of the 
dominant firm.   
 
It remains to be seen how the features of market power, banking/borrowing and noncompliance 
together impact permit price distortion. What is the role of initial allocation of permits in this 
extended  framework?  Our  model  here  examines  how  co-existence  of  market  power  and 
noncompliance affects the efficiency and effectiveness
2 of the emissions trading system when 
banking-borrowing is also allowed as can be expected in reality. The model extends the work of 
Egteren and Weber (1996), Rubin (1996), and Chevallier (2008).  
 
2.   Model 
 
                                                 
1  While  the  feature  of  banking  is  more  prevalent  in  programs,  borrowing  is  limited.    Overlapping  cycles  of 
compliance  periods  (year)  allow  for  implicit  borrowing  during  the  windows  of  overlapping  months.    There  is 
evidence of borrowing among firms under the EU ETS phase I (2005-08), where operators used their next year’s 
allowances to demonstrate compliance with current year compliance (Trotignon and Ellerman 2008).  The operators 
were allocated their assigned allowances in end-February of each calendar year, but had to surrender units in April 
of the next year to demonstrate compliance, thus at the time of determining compliance firms had two annual sets of 
allowances  to cover their emissions, except for the final year of the trading period (ibid).  In infinite time horizons, 
unrestricted borrowing is not a desirable feature from the environmental perspective as polluters could have an 
incentive to postpone abatement infinitely.   
2 Efficiency in this model is achieved with equality of marginal abatement costs across firms and effectiveness is 
ensured when firms do not cheat. 
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There are a total of N firms in the permit market, with the dominant firm being represented by 
the first firm, i=1, and the competitive fringe firms by the remaining firms i =2,…, n.  The cost 
of emission abatement is denoted as Ci(ei) for each firm i, where ei(t) is the emission at time t.  Ci 
is decreasing and convex in emissions, such that Ci'<0 and Ci''>0, with Ci(0)=0.  The regulator 
distributes a predetermined stock of permits among the firms, and the initial endowment for each 
firm i at time t is denoted by li
0(t).  Assuming a unique permit price P(t) in each t, a firm i can 
engage in permit trade with other firms, buying yi(t) >0 (or selling, in case  yi(t) <0) amount of 
permits.     
 
Firms also engage in inter-temporal trade in permits, with both banking and borrowing being 
allowed except in the end-point T, with Bi(t) >0 denoting the amount of permits banked in t for 
future use (or borrowed, when Bi(t) <0).  We consider a continuous but finite time-horizon of T, 
and since a firm i does not inherit any permits in the beginning, we have Bi(0)= 0. Since a firm 
cannot borrow from the future, in the endpoint we have Bi(T)≥0.  If li(t) is the permit holding of 
firm i at time t, then the net permit banked in any point t can be represented as,        =   
     +
      −      .   
 
With regulatory enforcement being imperfect, there is scope for cheating among firms.  A firm’s 
emission level ei(t) may well exceed its permit holding li(t) at time t, and we denote this as 
violation of firm i at time t as       =    {      −      ,0}, i.e. by definition    ≥ 0.  In case 
permit holding is greater than actual emissions, then by definition violation is zero.  We assume 
that while firms know about their actual emission ei(t), the regulator would know only when it 
audits the firm.  The probability of firm i being audited is denoted by βi(vi), which is considered 
to be an increasing function of violation with βi'(vi)>0 and βi''(vi)≥0.  When the regulator detects 
violation, the associated penalty is      , which is also an increasing function of violation with 
  
  > 0,  
   > 0 for    ≥ 0, and with    0  = 0.  Consequently the net change in banked permits 
at t, can be re-written in terms of initial endowment of permits, current permit trade, emissions 
and violation as:        =   
     +       −       +      .  
 
Considering a Stackelberg leader-follower scheme in the market equilibrium, we first solve for 
the fringe firms’ and dominant firm’s optimization exercise in section 3; and then examine the 
features of the market equilibrium and firms’ cheating behavior in section 4. 
 
3.   Cost Minimization and Market Equilibrium 
 
3.1  Fringe Firms’ optimization 
The  price-taking  fringe  firms  minimize  the  total  discounted  stream  of  cost  associated  with 
emission abatement, permit purchase and expected penalty from violation, subject to the banking 
budget of permits.  Considering r as the discount rate, we have: 
     ,   ,         {        
 
 
  +           +                   }   
s.t.  
          =   
     +       −       +       
 
        =  0,              ≥ 0       for i = 2, 3,…., n. 
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The corresponding current value Hamiltonian and the first order conditions can be written as: 
  =           +           +                    +      {  
     +       −       +      }  
where       is the Lagrange multiplier. 
 
  
       =    
         −       = 0                 (1) 
  
       =      +       = 0                  (2) 
  
       =   
            +         
      +       =  0           (3) 
  
       =   
     +       −       +       = 0              (4) 
  
       =     −         = 0                  (5) 
           = 0                    (6) 
 
First-order conditions (1), (2) and (3) yield the equilibrium condition for the fringe firms,  
  −      = −   
    
∗     =      =   
    
∗      
∗  +      
∗   
    
∗        (7) 
 
The above condition gives the equilibrium levels (denoted with *) of emission, permit purchase, 
and violation at time t for the fringe firms.   
 
3.1.1  Fringe firm’s permit demand 
 
We derive the fringe firm’s response along the equilibrium path by differentiating (7): 
−     = −   





=    
     + 2  
   
  +     
   
   
  
              = 2,3,…, . 
⇒      





   < 0 
     





     + 2  
   
  +     
   > 0  
 
Since   
∗    =   
∗    −   
∗    −   
    , the change in permit demand of firm i is given by: 
 
      
      = − 
 
  
   − 
 
  
        
   
      
   < 0               (8) 
 
With an increase in permit price, here the fringe firm can choose to abate more and cheat more 
(both of which become cheaper options, ceteris paribus) until equilibrium is restored with equi-
marginal costs across options (equation 7).  Thus price sensitivity of permit demand is higher in 
this model with non-compliance compared to the price sensitivity in a model with no cheating (in 
the latter,  
   
   = − 
 
  
  ).  I.e., the price elasticity of permit demand,    = 
      
      .
 
  
 of the fringe 
firm is greater here compared to a full-compliance model. 
 
3.2   Optimization for the Dominant Firm   
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The dominant firm determines the price P(y1(t)) in the permit market while minimizing its total 
discounted cost of abatement, permit purchase and expected penalty over the finite period T, 
subject to its banking condition and the permit market clearing at each point in time.  
     ,   ,         {        
 
 
  +            +                   }   
s.t.  
          =   
     +       −       +       
         =  0,              ≥ 0             
 ℎ                ℎ  ℎ         + ∑        
    = 0    ∀  .  
 
The corresponding current value Hamiltonian of the dynamic minimization and the first order 
conditions can be written as follows: 
  =            +            +                    +      {  
     +       −       +      }  
  
       =    
         −       = 0                 (1′) 
  
       =   .      +   +       = 0                (2′) 
  
       =   
            +         
      +       =  0          (3′) 
  
       =   
     +       −       +       = 0             (4′) 
  
       =      −         = 0                  (5′) 
           = 0                    (6′) 
 
First-order conditions (1′), (2′) and (3′) yield the equilibrium condition: 
 
−      = −   
    
∗     =   .  
∗    +      =   
    
∗      
∗  +      
∗   
    
∗     (7′) 
where        < 0,and     > 0 
 
Market equilibrium:  Assuming an interior solution exists, from the optimality conditions (7) 
and (7′), the market equilibrium is characterized by: 
     = −   
    
∗  −   .  
∗ = −   
    
∗  = −   −   .  
∗ = −   =
  
    
∗      
∗  +      
∗   
    
∗  −   .  
∗ =   
    
∗      
∗  +      
∗   
    
∗      (9) 
and        + ∑        
    = 0    ∀   
 
4.    Features of the permit market equilibrium 
 
4.1 Efficiency in Abatement Cost 
 
Following the market equilibrium characterized in (9), the relationship between the marginal 
abatement costs of dominant and fringe firms can be written as: 
     = −   
    
∗     −   .  
∗    = −   
    
∗             = 2,3,…, .        
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⟹ −   
    
∗  = −   
    
∗  1 +
  .  
∗
                  (9a) 
 
It is evident that the efficiency in abatement (equal marginal abatement across firms) is ensured 
in this model only when the dominant firm does not engage in trade, i.e. when   
∗    = 0 a la 
Hahn.  The degree of inefficiency, i.e. the difference in the marginal abatement costs of the 
dominant firm and a typical fringe firm, represented by 
  .  
∗
   is the inverse of the price elasticity 
of demand for permits of the dominant firm.  (This is similar to Chevalier (2008), except that 
here due to the presence of cheating we cannot equate the dominant firm’s permit trade to the 
emissions in the system without bringing in violations.) 
 
Although efficiency is ensured when permit purchase of the dominant firm is zero, in this model 
since there is possibility of cheating, zero permit trade does not necessarily imply that initial 
allocation of permit to the dominant firm is equal to optimal permit holding at time t.  Thus while 
the  cap  and  trade  system  may  succeed  in  achieving  equi-marginal  abatement  cost,  optimal 
violation  of  the  dominant  firm  could  be  positive:    
∗    =   
∗    −   
∗    −   
     = 0;  with  
  
∗    =   
∗    −   
     > 0.   So market equilibrium is not effective in capping the system’s 
emissions as long as equilibrium violations of the firms are greater than zero. 
 
4.2  Effectiveness of the Cap and Trade Program 
 
The emission cap in the system is the total number of permits allocated across firms over time 
  ∑   
      
   
 
    , and for simplicity we interpret effectiveness of the cap-and-trade system as zero 
violations of firms at each point in time, i.e. when   
∗    and   
∗    are zero for all t.  In other 
words, we ignore the case of any firm over-complying (  
∗    < 0,  = 1,…,   and offsetting 
violation across time.  The simplifying definition of non-effectiveness of the cap and trade model 
in our finite period model as non-zero violation in any point in time, implies that no firm ever 
has incentive to over-comply, and helps us to obtain insight into the nature of non-compliance 
behavior of the firms, and in particular that of the dominant firm. The conditions for compliance 
implies that, in equilibrium the marginal expected penalty is greater or equal to the marginal cost 
of  emission  permit,  and  greater  than  the  marginal  abatement  cost  for  the  firms.    For  the 
compliant fringe firm we get the condition, as follows: 
−      = −   
    
∗     =      ≤    
  0    0  +    0   
  0                     = 2,3,…,       ∀       
Since    0  = 0, considering the equilibrium at equality we get the condition for compliance:  
   0   
  0  =   = −   
    
∗  ≥ 0                  (10) 
 
It is evident that as in Egteren Weber (1996), here the compliance decision of the fringe firm i is 
independent of the initial allocation of permit,   
    , in any point t.    
 
Similarly, for the compliant dominant firm (i.e.   
∗    = 0), we get the condition: 
−      = −   
    
∗     =   .  
∗    +      ≤    0   
  0                ∀   
Considering the condition at equality: 
  {  
∗    −   
    } +      =    0   
  0               (10′) 
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⟹  compliance  at  time  t    of  the  dominant  firm  is  dependent  on  its  initial  allocation  of 
permits,   
    , in contrast to condition for the fringe firm.  
 
4.3 Cheating: Fringe firms vs dominant firm   
 
4.3.1 Sufficient conditions for cheating 
The  equilibrium  conditions  for  compliance  in  section  4.2  provide  the  sufficient  conditions 
cheating for the firms in the market.  The sufficient condition for a fringe firm to cheat is: 
   0   
  0  <    for i= 2, 3, …., n;                (11) 
and for the dominant firm to cheat is: 
    
∗    +      >    0   
  0                 (11′) 
 
The presence of market power in (11′) means that the implications are different for the dominant 
firm when it is a net buyer versus a net seller of permits.  In case the dominant firm is a net buyer 
of permits,   
∗    =   
∗    −   
     > 0, the first product term (    
∗  on the left hand-side of the 
equation (11′) is negative, thus the sufficient condition for non-compliance or cheating implies 
that      ≫    0   
  0 .  However, when the dominant firm is a net seller,     
∗ is positive, so 
it is possible to have either      <    0   
  0  or,      >    0   
  0  as long as the total sum 
of the two terms ensure the inequality in (11′) to hold, i.e. satisfy the sufficient condition for 
violation.   
 
In the special case where the penalty functions of the dominant and fringe firms are the same, the 
above asymmetry can give rise to a case where the following inequality holds: 
     
∗    +      >    0   
  0  =    0   
  0  >              (12) 
such that the fringe firms have zero violation, but the net seller dominant firm is cheating as long 
as  the  market-power  effect      
∗     is  large  enough  (or  price  distortion  compared  to  the 
competitive equilibrium) to ensure the above.  It is more likely for the regulator to choose a 
higher probability of detection and associated penalty for the dominant firm compared to fringe 
firms, in order to offset this market-power effect.  
 
4.3.2 Relationship between firms’ violations 
It is interesting to track the relationship between the non-compliance behaviors of the two types 
of firms.  From the market equilibrium in (9), we have   
   
    
∗      
∗  +      
∗   
    
∗  −   .  
∗ =   
    
∗      
∗  +      
∗   
    
∗       
 
Differentiating the above w.r.t time along the equilibrium path, we get: 
   
     + 2  
   
  +     
   
   
∗
  
−     .  
∗ +    
   
∗
  
=    
     + 2  
   
  +     
   





   
∗
   =
  
   .  
∗    
   
∗
    based on the dominant firm’s optimal condition, we get 
 
   
∗






   .  





                   (13) 
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where S denotes the change in marginal penalty for the firms:    =   
     + 2  
   
  +     
  >0 and 
   =   
     + 2  
   
  +     
   > 0;  and    =
   .  
∗
     characterizes  the  curvature  of  the  dominant 
firm’s permit demand (elasticity of slope of its permit demand) and change in price distortion 
element.  Recall,        < 0,and     > 0, such that the elasticity term in equation (13) will be 
negative when dominant firm is a net buyer of permits, and it will be positive when the dominant 
firm is a net seller.   
 
This implies that the violation of the fringe firm would move together with violation of the 
dominant firm, i.e. 
   
∗
   
∗ > 0 increasing the total violation in the system, when    + 2 > 0.  This 
will be true when the dominant firm is a net seller, and also true when the dominant firm is a net 
buyer as long as  > -2.  On the other hand, the violations of the fringe and dominant firm will 
offset each other in the model, i.e.  
   
∗
   
∗ < 0 when  < -2. The latter can hold only in the case of 
the dominant firm being a net buyer of permits in the market, with a high elasticity of the slope 
of the permit demand.  In the special case, where the dominant firm has a linear permit demand 
curve, we get  =0 and 
   
∗
   
∗ =
  
   
> 0, with the result that violation of the fringe and dominant 
firm reinforce each other. 
 
4.3.3 Initial permit endowment of dominant firm and cheating  
 
Over time we expect the regulator to reduce the allocation of permits (as the cap is reduced over 
time), i.e. 
 [∑   
   
       ]
   < 0.  It is thus interesting to examine the effect of the change in initial 
permit endowment on the violation of the dominant firm.  We differentiate (7′) w.r.t. time to 
obtain: 
      
∗ + 2    








   
∗
  
  =   






   
∗
   =
  
    
  
   
∗
    based on (7′), and rearranging the terms we get,   
   
∗
   
  = −   
   
 
     
∗     +
 
   





               (14) 
 
where    =   
     + 2  
   
  +     
  > 0, and    
  >0.  The terms within the brackets in the right 
hand side of equation (14) are the inverse of change in marginal cost of permits, inverse of 
change in marginal abatement cost and the inverse of the change in marginal penalty cost for the 
dominant firm.  The violation of the dominant firm will decline as its initial permit allocation 
declines,  as  long  as  combined  effects  from  the  three  is  negative,  such  that   
   
∗
   
   >  0.    The 
necessary and sufficient conditions are: 
1
     
∗ + 2   < 0,     
1
     
∗ + 2    >
1
   




⟹   > −2,     
 
         >
 
   
   +
 
  
                15  
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Thus  when  the  change  in  marginal  abatement  cost  and  marginal  expected  penalty  of  the 
dominant firm are relatively high compared to the change in price distortion element, (15) will 




The dynamic equilibrium analysis in our model with twin imperfections of market structure and 
regulation  (i.e.  market  power  and  non-compliance)  extends  the  results  of  the  established 
literature (Hahn 1984, Egteren and Weber 1996, Chevalier 2008).  In the presence of cheating, 
the permit demand curve becomes more price-elastic, compared to a model with no cheating.  
We find the initial allocation of permits to the dominant firm continues to play a significant role 
in both the cost-efficiency of abatement (Hahn 1984) as well as effectiveness of the cap-and-
trade system (Egteren and Weber 1996).  Moreover, the second-order price sensitivity of the 
permit demand of the dominant firm (characterizing the price distortion in the model) plays a 
critical  role  in  the  relationship  between  compliance  behavior  of  the  fringe  firms  and  the 
compliance  behavior  of  the  dominant  firm;  as  well  as  in  the  compliance  behavior  of  the 
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